Table 9.11 shows participant feedback for managed termination and the researcher's response to the comments.
Table 9.11 Managed Termination.
Participant | Feedback | Researcher Response |
FG05 | Could give more consideration to commercial models to make this section of the IMM more robust e.g. default management / major default management treatments | Accepted. A review of literature will be conducted to identify additional treatments |
FG07 | Termination does not require repeated offences to invoke termination, as stated in the conference paper | Accepted. A single major default has the potential to trigger termination. A PPP concession can also be terminated by mutual agreement between the partners (see Chapters 5-6 and 8) |
The Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (2013b) offers generic advice which could apply to managing the termination process of PPPs, building upon treatments already identified for this research (see Chapters 6 to 8):
- Governance should require the outgoing private partner to co-operate with the new incumbent during hand-over. It is likely that some interaction during this period between consortia will be necessary. Interaction could extend to establishing an understanding of the outgoing partner's capabilities, processes, assets, documentation, etc that will not be handed-over to the new consortium or public partner, and / how these should be sourced to ensure the provision of public services are not disrupted; and
- Manage intellectual property issues. Issues or concerns may be raised by the outgoing private partner that the new incumbent may use its intellectual property in delivering services through accessing sensitive commercial documentation, etc. Such situations can potentially result in costly legal action unless effectively managed.
Although these issues may be viewed primarily as a private sector matter (to be resolved between consortia with limited public partner involvement or interference), the public partner as the PPP client can be adversely affected by non-cooperative behaviour (e.g. delays and / or costs) that impact upon public sector business, as ultimately, the moral hazard associated with operational failure remains with the state (see Chapter 8: '8.7.6 Reputation Damage'). This scenario thus establishes a new relationship for the IMM between 'Managed termination' and 'Organisational culture' as the public partner may need to be proactive in trying to influence the timely exchange of information, etc between consortia to maintain intended VfM outcomes.