It is recommended that further research is undertaken to establish:
1. Whether there are jurisdictional patterns between the adoption of the public partner's preferred contract management style for achieving VfM and organisational culture in separate projects, particularly in mature PPP markets e.g. in Australian states and territories, or between local authorities and National Health Service trusts in the UK. This recommendation stems from the interview findings, where a link was established between the choice of decision-makers' approach for achieving VfM as part of the contract management function. As such, individual governments may take a strategic view on which approach should be adopted for managing contractual oversight across all PPPs under that jurisdiction. Further research should focus on identifying critical success factors and their drivers, and the evidence that points towards achievement of VfM outcomes for each PPP for comparison;
2. The extent to which incentives offered to public employees in PPPs, meet performance expectations in practice i.e. the degree that incentives are actually used to shape desired public employee behaviour, increase motivation and improve overall productivity. This should include examining which incentives work best and under what circumstances, and which incentives are most cost-effective to implement and maintain for each PPP. This should be examined because it is likely that better employee performance will lead to better project outcomes;
3. How public partner employees obtain their knowledge of the commercial and legal underpinnings of PPP contract management processes e.g. formal qualifications or on-the-job training (or a combination of both), and how the knowledge and skill levels of public partner PPP teams can be raised to improve VfM outcomes for the state. This may be important as the research findings point towards the need for strong public sector contract management knowledge and skills; and
4. The extent to which restructuring of public partner agency authorities (e.g. the transfer of project or statutory obligations from one public sector entity to another) presents value to government. This should include reviewing the longer-term impacts of decision-making relating to the effectiveness of revised governance for affected PPPs, against their previous arrangements, and to assist with the identification of 'better practice' governance models, where economies of scale can be found and applied across multiple projects.
Future (as distinct from further) research could consider PPP operational management from a private sector perspective. The current research has not attempted this, since it is likely that the private partner in PPP will face different management issues; particularly since the private partner (the concession-holder) will comprise multiple stakeholders each needing to deal with their own issues.