For the interviewees, having a view on how to achieve VfM seems easier to them than trying to provide an interpretation of what it means. As a consequence, only a few participants (RK10; PT05; PT03; PT08) offered explanations. For RK10, VfM involves price, performance and quality, whereby VfM is obtained when 'the solution drives the best price for the best performance for the best outcome'. This differs from the view of PT05 who talks about strategic fit and quantification of additional benefits obtained from a partnership beyond the financial elements: 'VfM is quantifying the added extras of a partnership over and above the dollars in terms of quality and there is also an element of strategic fit'. The other interviewees frame their definitions by referencing the procurement arrangements of two Australian state governments. With regard to the jurisdictional aspects, PT03 is inclined to view VfM from a Victorian Government Purchasing Board-style characterisation where VfM is achieved through a 'balanced assessment of benefits and costs over the whole of life of the investment' and for PT08, VfM is defined by the New South Wales Public Authorities Financial Arrangements Act 1987, 'when the winning bid beats all others and beats the PSC'.
Interview participants also found it challenging to define 'VfM' from partnership and performance management perspectives that relate solely to the operational phase of PPPs as it is generally considered that the VfM concept is rooted in the entire lifecycle of the asset. However, some participants offer VfM considerations that can apply to both partnership and performance management during PPP operational governance:
• Partnership management - VfM may be achieved using the principle of reciprocity (PT06) i.e. through give and take where both partners may, from time to time (and for the right reasons), go 'above and beyond' the 'black letter' approach for each other to attain a desired outcome. In such circumstances where relationships work well and the right sorts of people are involved in managing the contract, it may be possible to add additional value over time e.g. by introducing new technology that has been developed outside of the PPP in order to get a better outcome (PT03). Furthermore, VfM can be demonstrated when the private partner identifies issues or potential issues and brings them to the attention of its public partner before they become major challenges that could severely impact upon government business (PF03); and
• Performance management - for the public partner, VfM is sought and obtained from its private partner through consistent delivery of contracted services e.g. delivering services on time and to agreed standards (PF07) and through efficient and effective public sector contract management oversight (PT05). PF09 provides a broader view: 'VfM is...about [the] quality of services offered, performance history, service delivery program, operational support, skilled personnel, ongoing maintenance and whole of life programs'.
With respect to risk management, known risks should be continually monitored and managed during the operational phase because risk appetite can change over time and existing risk positions may not be broken down or be static (RK04). Equally, it is important to identify the source of new risks, their drivers and to whom the consequences (or benefits) flow (RK04). New threat risks, or changes in the severity of previously identified risks, can quickly and adversely impact value propositions. Opportunity risks, and their exploitation to improve VfM, on the other hand, may arise with far less frequency and make substantial demands on the operational management resources of public partners in PPP.