1 Trebilcock and Rosenstock 2015, 335.
2 Leviakangas, Ojala, and Toyli 2016, 10.
3 World Bank, http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/overview/what-are-public-private-partnerships.
4 Cruz and Marques 2013.
5 Trebilcock and Rosenstock 2015, 336.
6 United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/infrastructure-industrialization/.
7 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17.
8 Zverev, 1.
9 Mouraviev and Kakabadse 2015, 182.
10 Moszoro et al. 2014.
11 Further details on the methodological changes are described in the project website at http://bpp.worldbank.org.
12 See glossary for the complete definition, also referenced at the beginning of this section.
13 See the glossary for the complete definition.
14 This assessment could be undertaken either through a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), a cost-effectiveness analysis, or multicriteria analysis, as appropriate, or other relevant methodologies.
15 Although interlinked, financial viability and market sounding refer to different aspects of the commercial viability of a project. The financial viability or bankability assessment compares the cost to operate, maintain, and replace assets with the benefit of the project using market prices, while market sounding evaluates the appetite for the project in the market, looking for evidence of investors' and private operators' interest in the project.
16 According to Section 17. (1) of the Federal Budget Law.
17 Law No. 96-766 of 3 October 1996, promulgated the Environment Code.
18 Article 7.2 of Decree No. 2012-1151 of December 19, 2012, relating to Public Private Partnerships contracts; Decree No. 96-894 of September 8, 1996, related to the rules and procedures applicable to environmental impact study of development projects.
19 Law No. 1/14 of April 27, 2015, related to the general regime of public-private partnership contracts.
20 Section 3.0, Step 4 of the Business Case Development Model; Section 3 of the Procurement Analysis Guide.
21 Section 4.3.3 of the New South Wales PPP Guidelines.
22 Section 5.2.1 of Volume 2 of the National PPP Guidelines.
23 Article 5 and 6 of the Circular on Issuing the Interim Measures for Administration of Information Disclosure for Public-Private Partnership Integrated Information Platform (CaiJin [2017] No.1), published January 23, 2017. See http://www.cpppc.org.
24 Art. 26 of Decree 1350/14.
25 Section 60. (1) of the Federal Budget Law states that the competent line ministry shall reach agreement with the Federal Minister of Finance for the execution of any project [sec. 57 (1)] and creation of the related liabilities, the settlement of which upon maturity shall require expenditures by the Federal Government in multiple fiscal years or at least in a single future fiscal year (future obligations). The Federal Minister of Finance shall in the context of his or her collaboration take particular care to ensure that the prerequisites under sec. 58 (1) have been met and that the requisite report is submitted pursuant to sub-sec. 3 or that the required federal statutory authority under sub-sec. 4 is obtained.
26 Terminology and practice in this area vary across jurisdictions (pre-bid/pre-proposal/pre-tender). Procuring Infrastructure PPPs 2018 emphasizes that when this type of interaction with the bidders is regulated or is generally done, there is also a requirement or recognized practice to disclose the results of such interactions to all bidders.
27 Some governments impose limits on when clarifications can be sought, to avoid revealing information close to the bid deadline that could benefit some bidders over others. When circumstances force the procuring authority to reveal information close to the bid deadline, the deadline should be extended to provide bidders enough time to reflect any new information in their proposals.
28 Pursuant to Article 46 (2) (a) of the EU Directives, a contract may not be concluded following the decision to award a contract falling within the scope of Directive 2014/24/EU or Directive 2014/23/EU before the expiry of a period of at least 10 calendar days with effect from the day following the date on which the contract award decision is sent to the tenderers and candidates concerned if fax or electronic means are used or, if other means of communication are used, before the expiry of a period of either at least 15 calendar days with effect from the day following the date on which the contract award decision is sent to the tenderers and candidates concerned or at least 10 calendar days with effect from the day following the date of the receipt of the contract award decision.
29 The Alcatel mandatory standstill period is a period of at least ten calendar days following the notification of an award decision in a contract tendered via the Official Journal of the European Union, before the contract is signed with the successful supplier(s). Its purpose is to allow unsuccessful bidders to challenge the decision before the contract is signed. It is named after a pair of linked cases in the European Court of Justice that are jointly known as the Alcatel case (Alcatel Austria v Bundesministerium fuer Wissenshaft und Verkehr, Case C-81/98). Within the United Kingdom, it was introduced by the Office of Government Commerce in 2005. The timelines in the discussion that follows are the minimum (of at least 10 days) under the Alcatel mandatory standstill period and show the days by which specific actions must be undertaken by the tenderer (a request for additional debriefing within the standstill period), and the contracting authority (notifying all tenderers of the award decision and completing any requested additional debriefing) in order to comply with the minimum period before entering into a contract (assuming no legal challenges are formally notified).
30 A more detailed description of the methodology, identifying the questions included in the Procuring Infrastructure PPP transparency scores, is provided in Appendix 3.
31 Lender step-in rights refer to a power under the PPP contract or in the applicable legislation for the lender to take control of the project in certain situations. Step-in rights are appropriate for limited recourse financing, where the lender is limited in its recovery of the project assets.
32 World Bank PPP Reference Guide 3.0, 3.6.3, Dealing with Change, p. 184.
33 Guasch 2004.
34 Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Chad; Congo, Rep.; Eritrea; Gabon; Guatemala; Lebanon; Malawi; Malaysia; Myanmar; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Rwanda; the Solomon Islands; Somalia; Switzerland; Tonga; and Zimbabwe.
35 Article 19 of the Croatian PPP Act. A similar approval is also required in the Czech Republic according to Article 186(1) of the Public Procurement Act.
36 Article 43 of the Djibouti PPP Law. Cabinet approval is also required in Jordan (Article 14 of the PPP Law) and Uganda (Section 26(8) of the PPP Act).
37 Article 8 of the Ecuador PPP Regulations.
38 Articles 54 and 55 of the Nicaragua PPP Regulation.
39 In Romania, if the modification or withdrawal incurs injury, the private partner is entitled to fair compensation according to the rules laid down in the public-private partnership contract. See Article 35 (3) of the PPP Law.
40 Article 47 of the Uruguay PPP Law.
41 Article 21 (12) of the 2014 Law of Togo.
42 Article 249 of the Law TRLCSP (complemented with Article 250).
43 Article 58 of the Implementing Procurement Regulation.
44 PPP Reference Guide 3.0, 3.6 Managing PPP Contracts, 155-56, 186-87.
45 EPEC 2011.
46 Sixteen economies do not explicitly regulate PPP contract termination: Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Malawi, Myanmar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Trinidad and Tobago. In addition, Austria, Croatia, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka regulate PPP contract termination as a general practice, but have no regulatory basis for such a circumstance.
47 Art. 3.1.20 of the Order of Azerbaijan.
48 Part 19 of the New Zealand Government Treasury Standard Form Public Private Partnership (PPP) Project Agreement.
49 Article 37 of the Indian Model Concession Agreement.
50 Termination and Force Majeure Provisions in PPP Contracts, European PPP Expertise Centre (March 2013), at 20.
51 Termination and Force Majeure Provisions in PPP Contracts, European PPP Expertise Centre (March 2013), at 10.
52 Sections 3.2.2 and 7 of the Benin PPP Guidance Note (Decree No 2014-349 of 2 June 2014).
53 Article 63 of the PPP Decree of Burkina Faso.
54 For Italy, see Article 176 (4) of the Public Contracts Code.
55 Article 32 of the Colombia PPP Law.
56 Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (https://ppi.worldbank.org/).
57 World Bank 2017b.
58 World Bank 2017b.
59 World Bank 2017c.
60 World Bank 2017b.
61 Hodges and Dellacha 2007.
62 World Bank 2017b.
63 Hodges and Dellacha 2007; World Bank 2017b.
64 World Bank 2017b, 2017c.
65 World Bank 2017b, 2017c.
66 Further details on the methodological changes can be found in the project website at http://bpp.worldbank.org.