Future stages
| It was always contemplated that the light rail system would be extended north of Gold Coast University Hospital/Griffith University, to connect to the existing heavy railway at Helensvale, and south of Broadbeach to Burleigh Heads and then to Coolangatta. These extensions were contemplated in the Concept Design and Impact Management Plan (CDIMP), published in 2009, two years before the PPP contract was signed. The CDIMP contemplated that the extensions from Gold Coast University Hospital/Griffith University to Helensvale, and from Broadbeach to Burleigh Heads would be delivered between 2016 and 2026, i.e. during the term of the PPP contract. It contemplated that the extension from Burleigh Heads to Coolangatta would occur after 2026.28 Whilst the Operator Franchisee acknowledged in the PPP contract that it had no right to participate in future stages of light rail network, the reality was always going to be quite different, as subsequent events have shown. |
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In 2015, the Queensland Government announced that it was progressing with the extension to Helensvale. It asked the Operator Franchisee to commence a procurement process for the design and construction of the extension. Three contractors submitted detailed tenders for the D&C contract. CPB Contractors was announced as the preferred contractor in March 2016, and construction commenced shortly after.
The Queensland Government has indicated that the design and construction of the 7.3 km extension (including four additional light rail vehicles, to be manufactured by Bombardier Transportation) will cost taxpayers $420 million.29 However, no details have been made publicly available regarding the additional costs that the Government will incur in connection with the operation and maintenance of the extension by the incumbent Operator Franchisee and its incumbent Operator.
Whilst the design and construction costs for the extension have been determined by a competitive tender process, the operating and maintenance costs have not. And although the operating performance regime for Stage 1 would have provided a benchmark for Stage 2, the Operator Franchisee would have been in a strong negotiating position for those aspects of the Stage 2 performance regime that needed to be negotiated.
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28 Gold Coast Rapid Transit Concept Design Impact Management Plan, Volume 2 Chapter 5, p7.
29 Gold Coast Light Rail - Stage 2 Newsletter, April 2016. Available at: https://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/-/media/Projects/G/Gold-Coast-Light-Rail-Stage-2/GCLR2-April-Newsletter.pdf?la=en