Variable | Proxy for | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
Rule of law | Legal risk | -0.572 (0.573) | -1.008 (0.698) | -0.729 (0.642) | -1.511* (0.772) | -12.600 (9.426) |
S&P rating | Information asymmetry | |||||
Tier 1 ratio | Bank | 0.010 | -0.001 | 0.080 | 0.070 | -0.149 |
| capitalization | (0.041) | (0.042) | (0.059) | (0.065) | (0.153) |
Liquid/total | Liquidity | 0.153*** | 0.152*** | 0.131*** | 0.140*** | 0.167*** |
assets |
| (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.039) | (0.046) |
Bank regulation | Bank structure | 0.003 (0.007) | 0.006 (0.007) | 0.003 (0.008) | 0.010 (0.008) | -0.021 (0.020) |
Nonperforming | Supervisory | 0.040 | 0.049 | 0.121 | 0.161 | 0.125 |
loan | mechanism | (0.090) | (0.095) | (0.106) | (0.126) | (0.155) |
Loan maturity | Loan | 0.043* | 0.054** | 0.046 | 0.062* | 0.057 |
(EW) | characteristics | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.032) | (0.034) | (0.038) |
Loan security | Loan | -0.051 | -0.098 | -0.175 | -0.284 | -0.152 |
| characteristics | (0.234) | (0.231) | (0.284) | (0.294) | (0.341) |
Tranche size | Loan | 0.001** | 0.001** | 0.001* | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| characteristics | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
Constant |
| -2.684*** (0.826) | -3.406*** (1.072) | -4.055*** (1.271) | -5.073*** (1.521) | -4.981** (2.133) |
Sector FE |
| No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
Quarter FE |
| No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Country FE |
| No | No | No | No | Yes |
Observations |
| 192 | 192 | 190 | 190 | 166 |
Prob > chi2 |
| 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Pseudo R2 |
| 0.233 | 0.268 | 0.339 | 0.394 | 0.402 |
... = not available or dropped, EW = equally weighted, FE = fixed effects, S&P = Standard & Poor's.
Notes:
1. The table presents ordinary least squares regression results to examine the determinants of the likelihood of bank loan syndications on project finance deals in Asia.
2. The dependent variable is the loan syndication dummy variable.
3. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the project level to account for correlation among projects in the sample.
4. An S&P rating variable that is not equal to 0 predicts success perfectly. S&P rating variable dropped in the regression result.
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Source: Authors' estimates.
The coefficients of liquid-to-total assets ratio are positive and robustly significant in all the specifications. The empirical result implies that higher bank liquidity is associated with better prospects for loan syndication on lending to Asian public-private partnership infrastructure projects. This is very much in line with the empirical estimates of Pavel and Phillis (1987), where they find a positive and significant relationship between bank liquidity and the prospects for selling a loan.
The coefficients of loan maturity variable are all positive and significant in three out of five specifications. This provides some evidence that loan maturity influences a bank's decision to form and participate in a loan syndicate. The empirical results also support the view by Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) that, if "avoiding duplicate monitoring costs or potential rent extractions is a relevant consideration, then lengthening a loan's maturity would enhance its syndication potential."