4. ORR conducted an independent review into the May 2018 timetable changes which found that government and industry made mistakes. Network Rail was in the best position to understand and manage the risks but did not take sufficient action. ORR found that diffuse accountability across the rail industry and government for different programmes resulted in a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities for the oversight and control of complex railway system risks.5
5. We questioned the Department and Network Rail on the lack of clarity over responsibilities for the timetable change. Network Rail told us that organisations within the rail industry underestimated the consequence of making such a significant change to the timetables in May. The Department told us that the rail industry continued to maintain until two days before the timetable change that everything was on track. It did not consider its role to be running the timetable process because those in the rail industry have the operational experience to do this most effectively, but acknowledged that it should have done more to challenge the assurances it received from the rail industry about progress. Network Rail disagreed that more assurances were needed. It asserted that, given industry experts did not identify the issues that emerged, the Secretary of State and any other Ministers would have been unlikely to be able to do so, even if more assurances were in place. Instead, Network Rail told us that getting right clarity of ownership within the rail industry for the timetabling process was fundamental to ensuring this kind of disruption did not happen again.6 Even though the Department distanced itself from responsibility for timetabling, it is nonetheless responsible for decisions about the introduction of new services that must then be accommodated into new timetables. The Department told us that the key learning point from the disruption was that it tried to introduce too many new services all at once and at a time when industry was not ready.7
6. The Secretary of State admitted in October 2018 that more than half of the daily disruption to rail services was caused by Network Rail.8 Network Rail told us that, in Scotland, there was close working between ScotRail (train operator) and Network Rail's Scotland route, with both organisations headed by the same person. However, passengers in Scotland still faced significant disruption from issues with rail infrastructure, partly due to the acute effects of the hot weather in 2018. Network Rail told us that it had commissioned independent experts to review performance in Scotland, who had recommended a performance improvement plan, the progress of which was being tracked with Transport Scotland.9 In recognition of the concerns about Network Rail's performance across Great Britain, ORR issued a provisional order on 28 November 2018 requiring Network Rail to report to ORR by 15 February 2019 setting out how it is identifying and the addressing the issues which were responsible for its poor performance.10 Network Rail told us that it was reviewing its improvement plans and that it aimed to have the plans validated by some of the train operators and present them to ORR by the end of March 2019. The new Chief Executive of Network Rail has also started a '100 day review' to examine greater devolution of responsibilities within Network Rail.11
7. In September 2018, the Department launched a 'root and branch' review of the management and operation of the railway, which will report in 2019. This independent review, led by the former British Airways Chief Executive and Deputy Chairman of John Lewis Partnership, aimed to analyse all aspects of the railway, alongside changing travel and work patterns. Recommendations were expected to improve the current franchising model in terms of reliability, delivering better services and value for money for passengers, commercial sustainability and innovation.12 The Transport Committee of the London Assembly had recently completed a review of London's rail network, recommending a more strategic, coordinated approach to planning investment and enhanced passenger engagement.13
8. In our previous report on rail franchising in April 2018, we recommended that the Department should ensure that the priorities and incentives of Network Rail and franchise operators are aligned to serve the passenger, and that these incentives should be embedded into contracts, rather than relying on good relationships between individuals.14 In its response to our report, the Government agreed with our recommendation. However, the Government's response did not set out any changes to the Department's franchising process so that contracts are improved, instead it set out current arrangements.15
9. We questioned the Department on what actual changes were being made to better incentivise joint working. It told us that it was involving Network Rail in the franchise letting process, and a member of Network Rail staff was embedded in the Department's franchising team. Network Rail similarly told us that its engagement in the franchise letting process had deepened over the last three and a half years. The Department did not provide further detail about the changes it was making to the franchising process. Network Rail told us that the invitation to tender for the two franchises which were currently being negotiated aimed to achieve a "deep alliance" between the franchisee and Network Rail activity in the geographical area, and with joint performance heads, joint control centres and closer timetable planning. It added that this could mean a single point of responsibility in the event of disruption in the future. For franchises which have already been let, the Department and Network Rail told us that the extent of joint working depended on the franchise, but asserted that joint working was already happening on a voluntary basis. The Department told us that 'Team Victoria' had been set up at London Victoria Station, where Network Rail staff and train operating staff are integrated, wearing the same uniforms and providing the same information to passengers.16
__________________________________________________
5 Office of Rail and Road, Independent inquiry into the timetable disruption in May 2018, September 2018 and December 2018
7 Q 76
8 HC Deb, 11 October 2018, Col 318
10 Letter from John Larkinson to Andrew Haines, 28 November
11 Qq 49-51; Minutes of meeting of the board of Network Rail, September 2018
12 Q 59; Department for Transport press release, 'Government announced root and branch review of rail', 20 September 2018
13 Transport Committee of the London Assembly, Broken rails: a rail service fit for passengers, November 2018
14 Committee of Public Accounts, Rail franchising in the UK, Thirty-Fifth Report of Session 2017-2019, HC 689, 27 April 2018
15 HM Treasury, Treasury minutes: Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Thirty First to the Thirty Seventh reports from Session 2017-19, Cm 9643, June 2018