2. Crossrail is a large, complex programme to run new, direct rail services between Reading and Heathrow Airport at the western ends of the railway, to Shenfield in Essex and Abbey Wood in south-east London at the eastern ends. When complete, the new railway will be around 73 miles (118km) long, with around 26 miles (42km) of new tunnels. Ten new bespoke stations are being built and a further 31 are being improved. Much of the construction work is taking place in small, enclosed and hard to reach places beneath London. New software is being developed to allow the trains to switch between three different signalling systems.2
3. The Crossrail programme aims to bring substantial benefits to rail passengers in London and the south of England, including reduced congestion and journey times, increased capacity on London's transport network and support for economic growth. Once Crossrail is open, it will become part of Transport for London's (TfL's) rail and underground network and will be known as the Elizabeth line. The Department for Transport (the Department) and TfL are jointly sponsoring the Crossrail programme, which is being delivered by Crossrail Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of TfL.3
4. Train services through the central section of the programme were due to start running in December 2018, and the full service due to start running from December 2019. Crossrail Ltd first announced in August 2018 that the programme could not be delivered on time and that it would not be in a position to open the central section through London in December 2018 as planned. In the 2010 Spending Review, the government allocated £14.8 million funding for the programme, which included contingency but excluded the cost of new trains and the main depot. In July 2018, the Department announced that the programme sponsors had agreed an additional £0.59 billion funding, taking the total funding package for the programme to £15.4 billion. In December 2018, the Department announced that as a result of further cost increases it had increased funding for the programme to £17.6 billion (some £2.8 billion more than the level of funding announced in 2010).4
5. In October 2018, we questioned the Department on the August announcement that the opening of the central section would be delayed and how it was monitoring and challenging the programme's progress. The Department told us that it began to have concerns that the December 2018 delivery date could not be achieved in "spring" 2018 but that Crossrail Limited maintained the schedule was still possible until it received formal notification of the delay, although its level of confidence started to diminish overt time.5 In December 2018 we questioned the Department again on its grip of the programme, cost increases and the additional funding package agreed. The Department told us that it was deeply disappointed and frustrated by the significant cost overrun but believed that the funding package should be sufficient to cover the remaining costs of the programme.6 In March 2019 we further questioned the Department and Crossrail Ltd and in April 2019 we published our progress review of the Crossrail programme, which focused on how the programme had been allowed to unravel and costs spiral out of control, examining who was responsible for what had gone wrong on the programme and what the major causes of cost increases and delays had been. This report builds on our previous report and scrutiny of the programme.7
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2 C&AG's report, paras 1, 8, 1.1-1.3
3 C&AG's report, paras 1, 1.2, 1.6
4 C&AG's report, paras 3-4, 1.8-1.9, 2.2, Figure 3
5 Committee of Public Accounts, Oral evidence - Department for Transport: Implementation of Brexit, HC 1657, 24 October 2018
6 Committee of Public Accounts, Oral evidence - Rail management timetabling, HC 1793, 27 February 2019
7 Committee of Public Accounts, Crossrail: Progress review, Ninety-second report of session 2017-19, HC 2004, 3 April 2019