6. In our April 2019 report on the Crossrail programme, we concluded that the Department, TfL and Crossrail Ltd's fixation on a delivery deadline of December 2018 led to warning signs that the programme was in trouble being missed or ignored. We found that the pressure on, and determination within, those delivering the programme to meet this deadline led to an overriding culture of over-optimism and that when Crossrail Ltd and the programme's project representative identified failings at a much earlier stage, they were not addressed as they should have been.8
7. We asked Crossrail Ltd why it remained committed to the December 2018 opening date for so long and when it had first become aware that the original opening date was undeliverable. The former Chief Executive told us that when he left Crossrail Ltd in March 2018, he believed that there was more than a 50% chance that the programme could be completed on schedule, despite the fact that there was so much risk remaining in the programme.9 The previous Chair of Crossrail Ltd told us that the first time he began to feel that the programme schedule was not achievable was in June 2018 because by that time it was clear that the programme was not making the required progress to support the opening date.10 He explained that he first informed the Mayor of London and the Secretary of State in July 2018 that there was no feasible way to deliver the programme on time and that Crossrail Ltd was considering options for a delay. He told us that the response from both sponsors was that it had to be completed in 2018. The Department told us that it asked Crossrail Ltd to do what it could to open something on time. The previous Chair explained that the Mayor's response was to ask if more money could incentivise contractors to deliver on time.11
8. The former Chief Executive told us that Crossrail Ltd had remained committed to the December 2018 opening date because it considered that the cheapest way to complete the programme was do so in the shortest possible time. He explained that the vast number of suppliers on the programme meant that any delay to the programme would lead to increases in the overhead costs of those contractors.12 The previous Chair told us that sticking to the deadline was important to keep contractors motivated to deliver?13 When asked whether he agreed with this, the current Chair of Crossrail Ltd stated that this approach was helpful up to point, but that by 2018 it caused things to go wrong. By 2018, delays to contracts and issues with, for example, access to work sites for multiple contractors were becoming more challenging. He stated that Crossrail Ltd now has other methods for applying pressure on contractors other than a final date, including a more intense approach to managing daily activities on the programme.14
9. Our report in April 2019 found that Crossrail Ltd's over-optimism about the potential to deliver the programme on time, even when the signs were there that this was unlikely, stemmed, in part, from the experience of overcoming challenges earlier in the programme.15 In May 2019, the previous Chair and Chief Executive told us at length about the complexity of the programme and the engineering challenges that Crossrail Ltd overcame. We were told that, even when an explosion at Pudding Mill Lane in November 2017 resulted in substantial delays to the energisation of the railway, the instinct of Crossrail Ltd was to go and fix it. However, the revised plans to complete the programme that Crossrail Ltd produced after the explosion still underestimated the amount of work to be done in stations.16
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8 Committee of Public Accounts, Crossrail: Progress review, Ninety-second report of session 2017-19, HC 2004, 3 April 2019
9 Qq 55, 166-169
10 Qq 162-163
11 Qq 57-69
12 Q 55
13 Qq 56, 82, 128
14 Q 213, C&AG's report, Appendix 3
15 Committee of Public Accounts, Crossrail: Progress review, Ninety-second report of session 2017-19, HC 2004, 3 April 2019
16 Qq 44, 48-51, 55