76. As Chair, I am often contacted by the public and other MPs to suggest the Committee look into certain issues. Very few topics have raised concerns, and piqued interest as much as two high-profile and troubled transport projects: HS2 and Crossrail. These projects have been on the Committee's radar consistently since their inception and we will continue to keep a close eye on them as they progress.
77. Crossrail, in particular, has been a matter of interest for the Committee over the past year and, after our progress review session in March, we were sufficiently troubled by our findings that we held a second inquiry on the project two months later. This is an approach that the Committee will be continuing: revisiting projects that have gone awry and monitoring progress until we see satisfactory improvement.
78. It was particularly worrying for us to see a project run into trouble when it had started so promisingly and appeared to be bucking the trend of poorly managed projects that come in front of our Committee time and again. However, Crossrail unravelled quickly and began to bear the hallmarks of these other projects-escalating costs, delays and no solid completion date in sight.
79. We saw that warning signs were missed or ignored; that those leading the project failed to sufficiently examine the bigger picture and eventually, the cracks in the programme became evident. Had these issues been addressed at the time, it is likely that the way in which the project fell apart so quickly was preventable.93
80. We accept that the project is now beyond the point of no return: such huge sums have been spent, and the project is now so far down the line that no other outcome is acceptable.94 However, we still have no assurance on a new timescale for its completion and we will be following Crossrail every step of the way to scrutinise any further slippage or unexpected costs.
81. HS2 too, has faced difficulties in delivering to budget and there have been reports that in order to keep within budget, fewer and slower trains will run. There are persistent question marks about the affordability of the programme, many of which relate to the accuracy of the project's land purchases.
82. We know that the NAO found that HS2's land and property acquisition estimates had increased from £1,120 million to £3,295 million over six years.95 Beyond this, a whistleblower claimed to the BBC's Panorama programme that High Speed Two Ltd had deliberately misled MPs with its cost estimates and that they were 'erroneously wrong'. We will therefore be keeping a close eye on the department's management of the programme, including how well assured it is that the budget for property acquisition will be sufficient.
83. We remain conscious that HS2 Ltd previously paid out almost £2 million in unauthorised redundancy payments. We do not expect to see anything remotely similar happen again. We hope that DfT can learn lessons from the Crossrail project-particularly in relation to weak governance arrangements-and apply these when taking HS2 forward.
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93 Committee of Public Accounts, Crossrail: progress review, Ninety-Second Report of Session 2017-19, HC 2004, 3 April 2019, Summary
94 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Completing Crossrail, HC 2106, 3 May 2019
95 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Investigation into land and property acquisition for Phase One (London - West Midlands) of the High Speed 2 programme, HC 1531, 13 September 2018