Large public infrastructure projects are funded wholly or mostly by taxpayers. Therefore the community at large has a stake in knowing how projects turned out, whether costs were well managed, and whether the initial promises were delivered. But at present, information on project delivery is not presented in a clear way.
Post-completion reviews should be conducted on all big infrastructure projects. Infrastructure Australia requires them in its Assessment Framework,170 and has elevated them to a principle of infrastructure decision-making.171 The Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Cities supports the notion that funding should be contingent upon proponents agreeing to post-completion reviews,172 and has laid out how they should happen.173 The Productivity Commission wants them too.174
Post-completion reviews are a matter of routine elsewhere. For instance, England's Post-Opening Project Evaluation analyses safety, cost, environmental impacts, accessibility, and integration with other local, regional, and national plans and programs. Norway's post-opening evaluation of major projects examines the monetised costs and benefits, including construction costs, levels of demand, accidents, and local air pollution.175
But no matter how often it's recommended in Australia that projects be evaluated post-completion, it almost never happens. Of large projects (costing more than $500 million) completed in the past four years, the only published post-completion report is for stage one of the Capital Metro light rail in Canberra.176
The lack of post-completion reviews reveals a desire by Australian governments to avoid accountability - and it amounts to a wasted opportunity to build internal capacity and learn from history.
Recommendation 8 State governments should be required by legislation to publish post-completion reviews of all projects costing more than $100 million. Reviews should include: • Eventual costs. • A rigorous estimate of eventual benefits. • An explanation of deviations from initial estimated costs and benefits. • Contract type. • Scope changes. |
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170. Infrastructure Australia (2018b, pp. 38-41).
171. Infrastructure Australia (2018a, p. 3).
172. DIRD (2016, p. 66).
173. DITCRD (2019, p. 20).
174. PC (2014, Recommendation 7.1).
175. Jong et al (2019, p. 77).
176. The Capital Metro Delivery Report includes a preliminary evaluation of benefits, and a revised estimate of the project benefit cost ratio: Transport Canberra (2019).