From interviews we collected the following information about the consenting strategy used for the TGP:
• Several interviews confirmed that the consenting strategy and designation for TG was developed with a traditional non-PPP procurement in mind (e.g. D&C or Alliance);
• One interviewee confirmed that the only consenting strategy is in the appendices to the business case - which was done after securing the consents. Waka Kotahi's expectation was a matter of then developing the detailed management plans to deliver the scope of work within the consent conditions rather than seeking new consents;
• Several interviewees mentioned the complexity of managing consents for TGP given the need to coordinate and liaise with five council organisations, at the same time also managing the delivery of a complex infrastructure project;
• Another view provided was that the changes in consenting could be attributed to different approaches in design philosophy between the preparation of the scheme estimate used in the DBC compared to what bidders were asked to bid back on re the RFP requirements;
• Multiple interviewees felt that the PB (WGP) did not understand the risks associated with consenting. An interviewee noted that Waka Kotahi tried to communicate this to WGP on a number of occasions and that this needed to be reflected in their consenting strategy;
• Several interviews also commented on the suitability, management style and local experience of WGP's key lead for managing consents;
• Some interviewees commented that the losing bidder was considered to have a much superior and detailed consenting strategy compared to the PB. Several interviewees commented that they felt the weakest part of the PB's tender was their consenting strategy;
• Multiple interviewees also noted that the handover from Waka Kotahi to WGP could have been better managed following Financial Close;
• One interviewee also queried the value of transferring all of the consenting risk where the Crown was better positioned to manage particular risks; and
• An interviewee provided several perspectives on the development and management of the TGP consenting approach:
- Waka Kotahi chose to seek regional consents (and Notice of Requirement) for TGP via the EPA/BOI consenting pathway. Under the EPA/BOI consenting process, there were limited opportunities to shape the decision and consent conditions (compared to a local/regional government consenting process);
- While local/regional government was not the decision maker and did not prescribe the conditions for TGP, responsibility for administering and monitoring compliance with regional consents issued by the EPA/BOI fell to local/regional government;
- Had the compressed construction timeframe under the PPP contact and the increase in earthworks and streamworks required to deliver the project been anticipated at the time of the BOI approval, information presented to the BOI and subsequent approved conditions may have been different;
- While there was acknowledgement and anticipation by the BOI that changes to the approved design would likely occur to some extent, and that additional consenting may even be required to accommodate those changes, there was no expectation at the time that the design would change as much as it did. As a general observation during the procurement period, it became obvious that there were interpretational differences between the PPP partners and the local/regional governments on the scope of consents granted and condition requirements. These differences became an ongoing issue and frustration post contract signing, and in some cases the differences were never properly resolved;
- In the early stages of the TGP post award, when it became obvious that the project parties were struggling to meet consent requirements, local/regional government provided significant effort and resource in an attempt to work alongside the project partners to address ongoing compliance and approvals performance issues. The 'Transmission Gully Improvement Project' was an example of this. Ultimately these initiatives did not achieve the desired outcomes and local/regional government was forced to resort to more traditional enforcement tools in an effort to encourage improved compliance performance;
- The project partners could have put greater effort in at an early stage to developing and implementing a comprehensive consenting strategy which resolved condition interpretation differences and addressed conditions which could not be complied given design and construction realities. Had this occurred in a timely, well-managed and considered manner this would have provided certainty and reduced frustrations for all parties throughout construction; and
- The understanding that P2W uses a different consenting approach to TGP in that a particular road design was not being consented, but rather an "envelope of environmental effects".