8 We examined 20 of the Department's 35 major programmes in the Government Major Projects Portfolio to examine in detail the challenges faced (Figure 10 on pages 61 to 63). The programmes we examined included:
• competitive procurements (for example, the Type 31e frigate), UK single source procurements (for example, the Astute attack submarine) and single source foreign military sales (for example, the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft);
• innovative digital and research and development programmes, as well as more traditional military platforms;
• programmes from across all the Commands; and
• some high- and lower-performing programmes, as well as programmes at different stages of the acquisition life-cycle.
9 We engaged with all 20 programme teams. The main areas covered varied but included: the current state of the programme; the main challenges and risks to delivery; relations with suppliers; the impact of recent departmental reforms; resourcing and affordability challenges; success factors; and good practice.
Figure 10 The Ministry of Defence's major equipment programmes considered in this report
Notes 1 The budgeted whole life costs of individual projects and programmes in the table is made up of a number of individual funding lines within the Department (some on contract and some not), sunk costs to date, administrative resource costs, and the costs of early years in-service support, as reported by the senior responsible owner for each programme. Full whole life costs are not currently available for some programmes. 2 Spend to date and budgeted whole-life costs are those reported by the Department's programme teams in December 2020 for the Warrior armoured vehicle upgrade programme and March 2021 for all other programmes. 3 In March 2021, the government announced in the Integrated Review that it had cancelled the Warrior armoured vehicle upgrade programme. 4 As at March 2021, the Department had not yet approved the Fleet Solid Support programme's budget. 5 Spend and budget for the Astute programme is for all seven boats in class. 6 We examined the Morpheus project within the Land Environment Tactical Communication and Information Services programme. Costs of Morpheus are not reported separately. 7 The budget for the Skynet 6 military satellite includes past and future costs for the three main sub-projects within the programme, as well as other associated costs. 8 The Department's Complex Weapons programme is a rolling portfolio of individual weapons acquisitions. The portfolio budget includes acquisitions that fall outside the arrangements with MBDA UK Ltd examined in this report. 9 Totals do not add up due to rounding. Source: National Audit Office analysis of the Department's documents |
10 Our approach to examining each programme varied depending on the extent of our existing knowledge and the nature of the programme (for example, whether competitive or single source, or sourced through foreign governments). We requested a common list of documents and data from programme teams, as well as further documents depending on the specific issues on each programme. Common documentation included documents/logs covering issues such as early market engagement, commercial strategies, investment appraisals, supplier management and risk identification and management.
11 In this study we looked only at a selection of the most significant and complex programmes within the Department's Major Projects Portfolio as at July 2020, which were classed by the Department as equipment capabilities. Within this group we excluded the following equipment programmes:
• F-35 Lightning programme - covered in depth in 2020 in the NAO reports on Defence Capabilities and Carrier Strike.
• Queen Elizabeth carriers - covered in depth in 2020 in the NAO report on Carrier Strike. This programme also left the portfolio during the fieldwork stage of our study.
• Dreadnought ballistic missile submarine - national security sensitivities would prevent disclosure of information. We intend to revisit the Department's nuclear enterprise work in the future.
12 Not all of the programmes we examined are included in each piece of analysis within the report as they are at different stages of development and delivery, and some do not follow the standard departmental procurement cycle with comparable decision points.
13 Since the programmes we have examined only constitute a small proportion of the number of projects and programmes which are being delivered by the Department, we have not sought to use our findings to comment on the Department's delivery of its whole equipment portfolio. However, given the fact that the programmes covered account for a significant proportion of the value of the whole portfolio, as well as their importance to national security, what happens to these programmes has considerable significance for the Department and taxpayer.